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Utilitarianism has a curious history. Its most celebrated founders – Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill – were radical progressives, straddling the worlds of academic 
philosophy, political science, economic theory and practical affairs. They made 
innumerable recommendations for legal, social, political and economic reform, often 
(especially in Bentham’s case) described in fine detail. Some of these recommendations 
were followed, sooner or later, and many of their radical ideas have become close to 
articles of faith of western liberalism. Furthermore many of these recommendations were 
made expressly to improve the condition of the deprived, or of oppressed groups. Yet the 
moral theory which inspired this reforming zeal is, at least officially, utilitarianism, and 
when we teach this theory to our students we feel it our duty to point out the horrors that 
could be justified by any theory which assesses the moral quality of actions in terms of 
the maximisation of good consequences over bad. No consequence is so bad that it 
cannot, in principle, be outweighed by a large aggregation of smaller goods. Hence there 
are circumstances in which utilitarianism can require slavery, the punishment of the 
innocent, and redistribution of resources from the poor to the rich, or from the disabled 
and the sick to the able bodied and healthy. Indeed, in the right circumstances, it can 
2justify pretty much anything you think of. For all their intelligence and imagination 
neither Bentham nor Mill seemed to recognise or discuss these catastrophic possibilities.
It is, however, no defence of utilitarianism to say that it was held by people who had fine 
motives and did not see its consequences. The current orthodoxy is that the central flaw 
in utilitarianism is that it ignores ‘the separateness of persons’. This phrase of Rawls’i
finds a clear echo in Nozick’s remarks that ‘There are only individual people, with their 
own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and 
benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the 
sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?)’ii
Thus Nozick and Rawls both suggest that utilitarianism proceeds as if morality is some 
sort of generalised prudence. On such a view just as an individual may accept losses for 
the sake of greater benefits, so might ‘society’. Yet, they counter, in reality all that 
happens is that one person gains and the other loses. This is no moral compensation. The 
gains do not justify the losses, even when they are bigger.
Consequently utilitarianism has been out of favour in philosophy for some time. It is 
remarkable that those with moral and political views as far apart as Rawls and Nozick 
have united to condemn it on apparently the same grounds (although this is less of a 
surprise when we realise that they both claim Kantian routes for their theories).iii In its 
place we find various views which assign rights to individuals which will block at least 
some, perhaps even all, applications of maximizing consequentialism. This is true even 
3for some views which are still sympathetic enough to consequentialism to retain the 
name.iv
Yet while philosophers have turned away from maximizing consequentialism, public 
policy decision making has embraced it. Many areas of public policy are dominated by 
cost-benefit analysis, which at least in its purest from is a particularly crude form of 
consequentialism: consequentialism of money. Many decisions, large and small, are 
informed by cost-benefit analysis. The topics range from the building of a new airport to 
the permissibility of performing a particular animal experiment. This is an important 
example of where what may well be regarded as an outdated and crude philosophical 
theory has taken hold – almost as a default or standard theory. This should worry 
philosophers. And, indeed, some have duly reported themselves worried.v Yet how we 
should respond to this situation is by no means clear.
This paper explores the parallels between maximizing consequentialism in philosophy 
and cost-benefit analysis in public policy decision making. I believe that each area can 
cast light on each other. My conclusion – to anticipate – is that these maximizing 
doctrines are very powerful but also very dangerous. Like a powerful but destructive 
technology, the task is understanding when to use it and when not to. The danger alone is 
not a sufficient reason to reject the technology if conditions of safe use can be understood 
and reliably implemented, especially if we are unable to find an alternative which better 
meets our needs. Hence I want to produce a highly qualified defence of both 
utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis. The qualifications I discuss in this paper are 
4these. First, I defend the theories as decision procedures rather than as moral theories in 
their own right. Second, they are adequate decision procedures only under certain highly 
constrained conditions.vi Indeed, these conditions may rarely, if ever, be met. However if 
the main argument of this paper is accepted then we have every reason for considering 
how we can move to a situation where the conditions are in fact satisfied.
Cost-Benefit Analysis And Its Difficulties
What we can call ‘pure’ cost-benefit analysis takes the following steps:
i) A qualitative statement of all costs and all benefits of a particular course of action 
(and perhaps its alternatives, including the alternative of doing nothing) is set out.
ii) These costs and benefits are then rendered in quantitative terms.
iii) These quantities are then converted into a single currency (usually money) and 
summed.
iv) A decision is made on the basis of which alternative provides the greatest net 
benefit in terms of the designated currency.vii
Any of these steps can be problematic. First coming to a statement of the full 
consequences of any course of action is difficult. Even when the possibilities are 
discerned – and this is difficult in itself - many consequences are uncertain and rendering 
them in probabilistic terms can be arbitrary and misleading. This is particularly so when 
outcomes will depend on the possible actions of other human beings, including the 
decisions they make take, including some in response to the decisions they expect us to 
5take. If we really were to take all possible consequences into account we would very soon 
be overwhelmed. Therefore simplification must be made, and this always has its dangers. 
Furthermore, there is a potentially indefinite number of alternatives to any course of 
action. How do we know which to consider? Onora O’Neill has argued that we will tend 
not even to consider alternatives we consider to be wrong.viii Hence even at the first step 
consequentialism appears parasitic on other moral norms. (However this may be less 
persuasive in public policy, where the constraints may be simply to stay within the law, 
than in personal morality where many other considerations may seem relevant.)
Even more contested is the step of converting other values into their monetary equivalent. 
This is often unsettling. For example when carrying out a risk cost-benefit analysis to see 
whether it is right to spend money to introduce new safety measures there seems no 
alternative to putting a financial value on reducing the risk of death. For ease of 
calculation this is rendered in terms of the saving a ‘statistical life’. Currently in the UK 
government policy requires decision makers to operate with a value of life – or rather a 
value of preventing a fatality -  of a little over a million pounds.ix To some this sounds a 
barbaric way of approaching the issues. A common response is that no price should be 
put on life. Whether or not one is sympathetic to this claim, and its appropriateness in this 
extremely difficult context, the fact remains that where values are genuinely 
unquantifiable or incommensurable cost benefit analysis will be in grave difficulties. We 
will return to this below.
6Yet even where there is no principled objection to the idea of measurement or 
conversion, the particular valuations can be highly contested. To give an example a 
number of studies have tried to estimate the ‘cost of a problem gambler’ in the context of 
considering whether the benefits of a liberal gambling regime outweigh the costs. A 
survey reveals that estimates over the last fifteen years or so, all backed up with detailed 
costings, and aggressive defence of methodology, vary from an annual cost of £373 to an 
annual cost of £35,300.x It is hard to resist the conclusion that these costings are typically 
used to support policies advocated on other grounds, rather than being based on some sort 
of neutral method of valuation.
However even if problems of quantification and commensuration can be solved, CBA 
may still run into difficulties. Bearing in mind the standard objections to utilitarianism, it 
is not difficult to see the parallel problems for CBA. A policy could have overall benefits 
yet be extremely costly to some individuals. Why, it will be asked, should benefits for 
one party justify costs which fall on others? Consider again the gambling case. Whatever 
we think about trying to quantify the costs, in qualitative terms they are well understood. 
Problem gambling can lead to despair, extreme child neglect, family break-up and 
suicide. Is it really right that we should determine gambling policy purely on the basis of 
whether the benefits to the economy as a whole are greater or smaller than the aggregated 
costs of the ruined lives of those who suffer? CBA, then, as a form of maximizing 
consequentialism, shares the defects of other forms.
7Now it should at once be admitted that the pure form of CBA is rarely seen. Some 
theorists and practitioners are often highly sensitive to the problems just outlined, and 
attempt to take appropriate steps. Consequently it is not uncommon to hear the argument 
that while political decisions should be informed by CBA it should not be the sole input 
into decision making.xi In effect this is to decline to take the final step of the pure model. 
Others, worrying about the third step – the translation of costs and benefits into monetary 
terms - have argued that because valuations are always contestable different groups 
should be encouraged to offer their own CBA of the same scenarios.xii
To avoid some distributional problems, the government has now proposed adding a 
further step in which financial benefits can be weighted for different groups.xiii So a 
benefit to the poor is considered to be of greater value than the same benefit to the rich, 
on the assumption that it will make more difference to their lives. This turns CBA into 
something closer to classical utilitarianism. Furthermore additional weights can be added 
to give even greater consideration to those who fare badly, which will move CBA to 
something closer to Parfit’s prioritarianism.xiv In other cases groups considered 
particularly vulnerable are given special concern. Their vulnerability could be something 
to do with their relation to the decision – for example people living in a particular 
location – or more general, the poor or the mentally ill. Hence, in effect, special steps are 
proposed to attempt to avoid the problem that society’s risks and costs are all dumped on 
a particular group who do not share in the benefits.
8In deference to worries about commensurability sometimes the analysis leaps from the 
second stage to the last, in which costs and benefits are enumerated and quantified but not 
placed on a common scale. This is the approach taken with respect to animal 
experimentation.xv This then leaves decision making to intuitive judgement rather than to 
the outcome of a quantified formal method. This type of ‘soft’ cost-benefit analysis may 
seem more reasonable, but it loses the advantages that led to the rise of CBA. For it is 
vulnerable to the criticisms that defenders of pure CBA pose; indeed the same objections 
which led Bentham to utilitarianism. Bentham, rather scandalously, argues that there are 
only two alternatives to utilitarianism. The first is the principle of asceticism  which is the 
mirror-image of utilitarianism – maximize suffering – and which Bentham plausibly 
points out has never been seriously maintained.xvi The second is the principle of 
sympathy and antipathy, which Bentham also calls the principle of caprice. This, 
Bentham suggests, approves or disapproves of an action ‘merely because a man finds 
himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them.’  The problem, Bentham continues, is 
that ‘What one expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external 
consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of 
approbation and disapprobation: this expectation is but ill fulfilled by a proposition, 
which does neither more or less than hold up each of these sentiments as a ground and 
standard for itself.’xvii
It is hard to disagree with the point that without the rigours of some formal approach to 
public decision making a great deal must be left to individual judgement – or likings or 
dislikings – of politicians and even unelected officials. Whether or not this is a problem is 
9arguable. Some will say that in reality we never have an alternative to intuitive 
judgement, and so CBA, at best, is a cloak for individual judgement, hidden away in the 
details, and at worst a cloak for abuse of power. On the other hand without some fort of 
formal methodology decisions will seem to lack a firm basis, a series of decisions may be 
inconsistent, and we may decline beneficial schemes in favour of relatively inefficient 
ones. Leaving so much to individual judgement opens the way if not always to corruption 
then to prejudice or lazy thinking. CBA and utilitarianism promise discipline. They 
provide a means of making decisions rooted in an analysis which can be scrutinised, 
questioned in public, attacked and defended. Bias and abuse of power can be detected by 
those scrutinising the calculations. In other words it provides public accountability 
(something everyone wants for others, even if, less often, for themselves).
What Are the Alternatives?
Economists are well-aware of the accusations against CBA. Their defence often is that 
they would be more than happy to give it up, if only someone would actually tell them 
what else to do instead of just complaining. Some critics of CBA have risen to this 
challenge by proposing ‘deliberative democracy’ or ‘public reason’ as a constructive 
alternative. Yet it is less easy to see what to do with this suggestion. Deliberative 
democracy is an attempt to substitute an auditable process for the auditable application 
of a formula. This has undoubted appeal, yet it is hard to see how this could be applied in 
the case of each and every decision currently taken by public officials. Discussion will 
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rarely lead to a consensus, and it is hard to see how all legitimate interests will be 
represented in proportion to their weight. Now there is of course a sophisticated emerging 
literature on the idea of deliberative democracy, and so this should not be dismissed.xviii
Yet although deliberative democracy may be highly suitable for very important issues, 
such as those concerning national sovereignty, or specialised local decisions affecting a 
defined population, such as new traffic schemes, it is harder to imagine how it can be 
used case by case to address the welter of mid-level resource allocation and development 
decisions faced by central and local government departments. Or at least it is hard to see 
how it could deliver consistent results. Perhaps this does not matter. However if one 
hopes to achieve some sort of cumulative effect through decision making it seems 
unlikely that it can be achieved without some more formal methodology.
What, then, is left? Bentham, it is true, identifies the idea of a formal, accountable,
methodology with utilitarianism, and does not consider whether alternative formal 
methods – quantified or unquantified – are possible. Nevertheless, those who oppose 
utilitarianism or cost-benefit analysis have a tough time. They need either to propose an
alternative accountable methodology, or to be prepared to give up accountability, trusting 
the intuitions and judgements of officials and politicians, and putting up with the risk of 
undetectable corruption, prejudice,  nepotism and what we might call ‘policy drift’. This 
is a version of a familiar dilemma. For example John Rawls opens A Theory of Justice by 
comparing utilitarianism and intuitionism.xix Utilitarianism is to be praised for offering a 
firm, principled, accountable methodology. Unfortunately it delivers some horrendous 
conclusions. Intuitionism need never deliver any results we don’t like, but in the absence 
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of an accountable methodology provides no argumentative purchase against those who 
disagree with the conclusion. In the case of CBA, the pure theory represents the analogue 
of utilitarianism, while the various modifications introduced to make its deliverances 
more appealing begin to turn it into something closer to intuitionism. For one might have 
little to say in defence of the exact weights and fiddles used to make the sums come out 
right when they are disputed. Indeed those who, in a spirit of concession, say that 
decision making should be informed, but not determined, by CBA are often in difficulties 
in explaining what else one should take into account, if not costs and benefits.
Rawls can be understood as motivated by the aim of having the best of both worlds: the 
rigour of utilitarianism, and the intuitive appeal of intuitionism. And this, indeed, may 
well be decision maker’s holy grail; an accountable decision procedure which produces 
only ethically acceptable results This is a motivation for both the form and the content of 
Rawls’ lexically ordered principles of justice. 
Rawls’s general approach is undeniably attractive and on the face of it, there seems little 
reason why it should not be translatable into a tool for public policy decision making. As 
already noted pure CBA is applied utilitarianism, and utilitarianism is out of favour in 
philosophy. The obvious next step is to state a more acceptable ethical or political theory 
and apply it to public policy.
Let us put aside the problem that not everyone accepts that Rawls’s theory of justice is 
correct. The question which concerns us is whether it really does provide a feasible 
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alternative to cost-benefit analysis for public decision making. So the question of how 
Rawls’ theory might be applied to public policy is at least worth taking seriously. Indeed 
one of the appealing aspects, for many, of Rawls’ theory is that it is designed, at least 
according to some interpretations, with the idea of feasibility firmly in mind.xx
Rawls’s theory is, of course, that first we should provide everyone with a fully adequate 
set of equal basic liberties; second that we should arrange for equality of opportunity; and 
third we should act so as to maximize the wealth and income of the worst off. Now Rawls 
is clear that the ‘we’ who act in such case is not you and me. Neither is it government 
officials or policy makers. Rather these are principles for the ‘basic structure’ of society; 
principles so fundamental that they inform the content of the constitution. There is no 
intention that any policy maker should make any direct appeal to the principles of justice. 
Consequently there is an apparent gap between these principles of justice and any 
concrete methodology for policy makers.
How can this gap be bridged, and Rawls’ principles made to yield a policy makers’ 
handbook? The first thing to note is that a great deal of public policy is addressed to what 
would fall under the first of Rawls’ two principles of justice: the liberty principle and the 
fair opportunity principle. For example the creation of a secure legal system can be seen 
as contributing to the implementation of the liberty principle, while education, and at 
least some aspect of the health system are arguably institutions designed to fulfil the aim 
of equality of opportunity. In these areas, although there may be questions at the level of 
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the development of detailed policy, the overall guiding aim of the institution should be 
clear, and so policy makers should be able to follow the principles of their institutions.
The problem I want to bring out centres on the final principle, the Difference Principle, 
which tells us to maximize the wealth and income of the worst off. How can we arrange 
public policy so decisions will turn out to be of the greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged in terms of their wealth and income? Now it may seem simple. We should tax 
the rich and give to the poor. Redistribution will achieve Rawlsian justice. However most 
public policy decision making, although often redistributive in its effects, will not be 
redistributive in its intentions. These include, for example, many decisions about 
management and development, both in economic terms and in terms of the material 
environment. Brian Barry points out that inflation, in effect, redistributes from those with 
cash savings to those with cash debts. So a decision to maintain any particular rate will 
have redistributive consequences.xxi How are decisions such as these to be appraised? 
Here, then, I am especially concerned with what we might think of as growth and 
management decisions, rather than those with an explicit redistributive intent and 
rationale.
As mentioned above Rawls does not argue that public policy decision makers should, in 
each decision, aim to make the worst off as well off as possible. And reflection on 
examples shows that to do so can be a crippling strategy. In deciding where to put the 
next airport, should the decision really be taken purely on the grounds of which location 
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(if any at all) would make the worst off best off (assuming that issues of liberties and 
opportunities were already dealt with or do not apply)? Even if maximizing the advantage 
of the worst off is one’s long term goal – as it should be for a Rawlsian – it is far from 
clear that it is best achieved through applying a direct strategy of this sort to every 
case.xxii
There are, in fact, at least two types of problem. The first is relatively straightforward 
where a short term loss to the worst off will lead to a longer term gain. For example the 
expense of having to purchase double glazing may be worth it if the new airport will 
eventually produce new employment opportunities with a higher wage.xxiii This should be 
reasonably easy to deal with. The second, and much more tricky problem, is where a 
general policy of allowing the possibility of uncompensated losses for the worst off might 
be of greater medium term net benefit even to the worst off than a policy which allows 
them only to gain. For a general policy which allows risk may well generate larger gains 
for everyone. This requires thinking of decisions as forming part of a series, even when 
they are taken in an uncoordinated way by different decision makers. What is needed is a 
general policy to cover such cases, which allows short term loss in the expectation that 
this will nevertheless be to the advantage of the worst off. We might call this ‘Rule-
Rawlsianism’ where we sometimes allow the worst off to lose. Yet is may not be at all 
obvious how we can formulate the algorithm for policy makers which will collectively 
generate the greatest advantage for the worst off. 
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Now it might be thought that I have exaggerated the difficulties. Any policy maker 
should do whatever is best to stimulate the economy; this will then expand the tax base 
and allow for greater redistribution to the worst off. Problem solved. However this 
ignores the uncertainty of the outcome of decision making. Consider, for example, the 
decision whether or not to bid for the Olympics, restricting attention just to financial 
consequences.The bid will cost money, and it might not succeed. Worse, we may win the 
bid but find that the economic consequences are negative. Only under the most 
favourable outcome will the economy be stimulated and generate economic benefits. 
Under all others it is likely that the poor will be made a little worse off. Considering this, 
if our concern is to ensure the position of the worst off, we had better not take this 
gamble. Yet, it seems, this conservative approach could be damaging over time, if 
generalised. So we are left with this puzzle: what is the right general approach to adopt?
The significance of this point is that while Rawls’s theory seems to provide the best hope 
for a formal, quantifiable, alternative to utilitarianism, and hence by extension to cost-
benefit analysis, it falls down at the vital point. If Rawls’s theory – a theory specifically 
designed with issues of implementation in mind – fails to yield a determinate decision 
procedure for policy makers, what hope is there for other theories? Hence it is easy to 
have sympathy for the claim that cost benefit analysis, in some form or other, seems to 
provide the only determinate methodology we have, in the sense of providing a formal, 
accountable decision procedure for public policy.
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How important is a determinate methodology, bearing in mind that in the case of 
maximizing consequentialism its cost can be unacceptable results? What good is a 
method if it doesn’t yield what we want? Here we might be reminded of the old joke 
about a drunk looking for his lost house key in a well-lit street, even though he dropped it 
in the adjacent dark street, arguing that ‘at least I can see properly here’. Certainly he is 
right that on the whole it is better to be looking for something in the light than in the dark. 
But if what he is looking for is somewhere else he will have a frustrating night ahead of 
him. However two points are worth making. Even though it is true that looking for the 
key in a well-lit street doesn’t help you find it when it is not there, this does not mean that 
the approach is ‘refuted’ and should not be used when you have reason to believe that the 
key is there. Second, and to continue to pursue this rather strained analogy, consider 
breaking the original search into two parts. In the first the contents of the neighbouring 
dark streets are trawled and dragged somehow into the well-lit street. In the second the 
light street is searched. Now this doesn’t seem so stupid. This is to attempt to convert 
cases where the method will not work into cases where it will; an ambitious strategy but 
not one to be disregarded entirely.
To put this in context, earlier we briefly explored responses to the fact that forms of 
maximizing consequentialism can yield counter-intuitive results. We can now see that 
they broadly fall into two types. The first is to modify the theory so it yields better 
results, through weights and incorporation of other factors. The second is to try to appeal 
to a different moral theory altogether. Both responses have grave difficulties. In the first 
case the more we modify the theory to make it more acceptable the more we lose both the 
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benefits of the maximizing approach and the discipline of a formal method. In the second 
we lose the method, and unless we find another we are sunk. But now I’m suggesting a 
third possibility: First try to distinguish the types of circumstances under which the 
method works from those where it fails.  Then we use the method where it works. What 
about cases where it does not work? One possibility, I have suggested, is that we might 
attempt to convert cases where it does not work into types of cases where the method 
works – drag them into the well-lit street. Of course conversion is unlikely always to be 
possible, and so various secondary strategies will be needed. But nevertheless the 
sensible strategy must be first, to take another look at the variety of cases, and try to 
achieve a systematic account of when maximizing consequentialism works and when it 
does not.
When Does Maximizing Consequentialism Work?
To advance the discussion I want to return to Rawls; this time to his discussion of the 
choice of principles behind the veil of ignorance. It will be recalled that Rawls argues that 
the question of what is the correct theory of justice comes to turn on the question of 
rational choice: the choice of those behind the veil of ignorance, who are ignorant of their 
own characteristics. The principles people would rationally choose in such circumstances 
are, Rawls argues, the correct principles of justice, at least for societies in the western 
liberal democratic tradition. The issue of the correct choice of principles, in turn, reduces 
to the question of the rational principles of choice to apply in the circumstances of the 
original position.
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For present purposes we need only compare Rawls’s favoured option – the maximin 
criterion, which leads him to propose his theory of justice outlined above - with the 
principle of maximizing expectations, or maximizing average utility (MAU) which would 
lead to average utilitarianism.
Rawls notes that some will be surprised by his preference for maximin over MAU.xxiv
For, as Rawls explains, MAU is taken almost as a definition of rational behaviour in 
many contexts, especially within economic theory. He argues, nevertheless, that the 
special circumstances of the original position make MAU an irrational approach.. For 
present purposes the most important special features are, first, this is a one-off situation, 
and second, the choice is highly significant in that if it goes wrong it will go very wrong. 
There are, Rawls says, ‘grave risks’.xxv Consequently, it seems implied by Rawls’s 
discussion, if these features were not present then MAU would be much more attractive. 
That is to say, if the situation was regular and repeating, and losses were not catastrophic, 
then the economists may well be right: MAU is rational under those circumstances. To 
illustrate suppose that each week you are faced with a lottery in which you can either 
have the certainty of £100 or a fifty percent chance of £300 (and a fifty percent chance of 
nothing). If you really were faced with this choice each week, and you were sure that the 
odds were genuine, then you would clearly end up better off by playing a regular strategy 
of MAU – gambling – rather than playing safe with maximin.
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We should note that choosing MAU does not entail that you believe that the correct 
theory of prudence is to maximize the average. On the contrary, you might be convinced 
that prudence requires one to maximize the worst reasonable possibility (i.e. maximizise 
the worst outcome but ignoring possibilities with freak odds). Interestingly, though, in 
this case both a reasonably cautious and an adventurous theory converge on the same 
decision procedure. This is an important, and potentially powerful, result. We can detach 
the theory of maximising consequentialism from the decision procedure, for the decision 
procedure may, under certain conditions, be compatible with a variety of theories.
There are, of course, cases where a cautious attitude would dictate a different choice. If, 
at the time of making a decision, you had no other money, and no way of surviving 
without money, then gambling would be very bold.xxvi But the main point is that over a 
long series, with true odds and no grave risks, the policy of maximizing average 
expectations – be it money or utility – will almost certainly lead to a policy of 
maximizing actual money and utility.xxvii  Under such conditions the policy of making the 
worst thing that can (reasonably) happen as good as possible tells you to follow a 
maximizing strategy. Consequently, to put it starkly, there are times when a Rawlsian 
should adopt the methods of a utilitarian.
Can we be more precise about these circumstances? Four conditions seem to stand out:
1. There need to be regular opportunities of a similar nature. (Call this the assumption of 
‘many chances’.)
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2. No single loss (or likely repeated series of losses) creates a type of level of harm for 
any individual from which recovery is very difficult or impossible. (The assumption of 
‘recoverable loss’.)
3. There is no reason to doubt that the probabilities run true. (The assumption of ‘true 
odds’.)
4. All relevant gains and losses can be quantified and compared to each other. (The 
assumption of ‘weak commensurability’.) 
Each of these conditions requires elaboration. First, ‘many chances’. Clearly it will be 
rare that anyone will be presented with exactly the same type of decision time and again. 
Rather what I have in mind, in relation to public policy, is some sort of ‘routine decision 
for government and its agencies’ so that the decision whether or not to bid for the 
Olympics, whether to build a high-speed rail link, whether to build a shopping centre, and 
what interest rate policy to pursue all fall within the scope of the class to be taken 
collectively. One-off decisions, in the intended sense, may be much rarer, and may 
include such things as a decision to go to war, although even this, arguably, could be 
included. The excluded class also includes those decisions taken explicitly to achieve 
aims of social justice.
The second assumption of ‘recoverable loss’ needs further thought, as no path through 
life is risk free, and maiming or death is not recoverable for the individual involved. 
Everyday we are exposed to myriad tiny risks; risks tiny enough that we can discount 
them for most practical purposes. Yet many public decisions will lead to deaths. If we 
21
win the Olympic bid and engage in major construction, it is close to certain that at least 
one construction worker will die. Nevertheless we are unlikely to think this a sufficient 
reason for not making the bid.xxviii Clearly we need to formulate the assumption in such a 
way that very small risks are permitted, yet it remains a puzzle to deal with this in 
detail.xxix
The assumption of true odds also needs explanation. In the case of tossing a coin, where 
there are true odds one can expect to be a winner roughly as often as being a loser, at 
least in the longer run. True odds would be violated if it turned out that men, or white 
people, or the educated, or the rich, won more often than women, or black people, or the 
uneducated, or the poor. Another way of putting it is that in the longer run one’s actual 
payout will come close to matching the statistically expected payout.
Now it may be that this assumption may be quite unrealistic. Indeed I have argued 
elsewhere disadvantages tend to cluster together, and those who do badly in some 
respects will come to find that they do badly in others in others.xxx Where we have a 
society where some groups tend to win and others tend to lose, then the application of 
cost-benefit analysis can continue to reinforce this. Such clustering of disadvantages 
needs to be addressed directly as part of a social justice agenda. Hence the arguments of 
this paper in defence of cost-benefit analysis are most pertinent when we have reason to 
believe that clustering effects will not skew the odds, or for a hypothetical future where 
we have overcome such effects. We will return to this.
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Finally, I have referred to the fourth condition as ‘weak commensurability’, allowing for 
sufficient comparability between different goods so that cost benefit analysis can be 
applied. Philosophically this is often regarded as highly dubious,xxxi yet it is important to 
understand what exactly is at stake.
For the purposes of making decisions, values of different sorts have to be compared, so 
that we can know where our priorities lie in cases of conflict over use of resources. As we 
noted, for example, in safety decision making a monetary value is put on saving a life of 
around one million pounds. Yet we should not assume that means that as a society we put 
a monetary value on each life, and that value is one million pounds, as if one million 
pounds somehow compensates for a death. It seems important, then, that we regard this 
as an equation used for making safety decisions rather than an all-purpose identification. 
Indeed this form of what I call ‘weak commensurability’ is consistent with what we could 
call ‘weak incommensurability’, which is the idea that the loss of one good – health say -
cannot properly be made up for by any amount of some other good, such as money. Many 
people may be prepared to assent to this form of incommensurability. Nevertheless, the 
acceptance of such a doctrine does not stop us from arguing that some health 
interventions provide good value for money while others do not. Yet that judges, of 
course, seems to pre-suppose weak commensurability. Hence it is possible to accept both 
weak commensurabilty (comparisons for some purposes) and weak incommensurability 
(non-comparisons for other purposes).xxxii We could define the strong versions of each as 
the denial of the weak version of the other.
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Consequentialism Reassessed.
It appears that the notorious counter-examples to maximizing consequentialism occur 
under circumstances when at least one of the first three assumptions - many chances, 
recoverable loss, and true odds - are violated. The classic ‘scapegoating’ objection to 
utilitarianism – hanging the innocent to calm the mob - probably violates all three in its 
classic version: it is one-off situation, the loss of being hanged is irrecoverable, and a 
person is picked not at random but because he is a member of a suspected group. Let us 
call circumstances in which these three assumptions, plus the further assumption of weak 
commensurability, hold ‘fortunate circumstances’, and where at least one is violated 
‘unfortunate circumstances’. Of course unfortunate circumstances come in degrees. 
When several of the assumptions are violated – as in the case of scapegoating - the 
circumstances are deeply unfortunate.
In fortunate circumstances - where the assumptions hold – gambling and the preparedness 
to lose from time to time pays. To put this another way, the strategy of taking the rough 
with the smooth should ensure more ‘smooth’ over the medium and long term, even for 
the worst off, than following any other strategy, such as the direct maximin policy of 
always trying to make the rough as little rough as possible.
With this in mind it is worth revisiting the ‘separateness of persons’ objection to 
utilitarianism. Nozick and Rawls, we saw, argued that utilitarianism falsely assumes that
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one person’s gain can morally override another’s loss. However we now see that in 
fortunate circumstances no such assumption is required. One person’s loss will be, if not 
compensated, than in some sense outweighted by that same person’s gain sometime 
earlier or later. When this is true, utilitarianism – as a decision strategy - really is 
prudence. There are gains which outweigh the losses within each life. However, in 
unfortunate circumstances - when the assumptions do not hold – the criticism is apt. 
Some may suffer uncompensated losses, of a very significant nature. How should we 
respond to these difficulties?
At least within philosophy, the most common response is to treat the lack of generality of 
utilitarianism as a reason for rejecting it. For if it can lead to unacceptable consequences 
it cannot be true. However, rejecting a theory is not, in itself to provide an alternative. 
And although there are plenty of more appealing approaches to personal morality, we do 
not seem to have many candidate alternatives for public policy decision making, as we 
have already seen. 
A second alternative is to adjust the theory so that the difficult cases cannot, or are least 
less likely, to occur. As we saw the, the idea of weighting benefits to the poor may avoid 
some unfairness, and this approach has been explored in Treasury advice.xxxiii
Unfortunately, though, there are two problems. First, and most obviously, unless some 
weights are absolute, horrors can still occur. Second, and more subtly, while weighting in 
one-off cases is to be recommended, to adopt weighting in what I have termed fortunate 
circumstances will do more harm than good, over time, even for the worst off. For it will 
25
impede risk-taking that will reasonably be expected to benefit everyone over time, 
including the poor (remember that in fortunate circumstances probabilities run true). Now 
if we are never in fortunate circumstances then this is less of a concern. But if we are to 
adopt weighting as a universal rule we begin to drain away some of the benefits of 
maximizing consequentialism.
These two problems push in opposite directions. To deal with the problem of catastrophic 
consequences we may wish to assign very strong individual rights. However once we 
trim the scope of consequentialism in this way we will lose even more of its benefits. 
Indeed giving people rights not to lose even in what I have termed fortunate 
circumstances is highly problematic. We are used to hearing about the tragedy of the 
commons – that land owned in common will be over-grazed, that oceans owned in 
common will be over-fished etc – and that private property rights of some sort are the 
necessary remedy. What we need to hear more about is the opposite – the tragedy of 
privatisation. Indeed there may be several tragedies of privatisation, but here I mention 
only one, concerning risk. Suppose, as is increasingly common, people are not prepared 
to accept the risk of (non-disastrous) loss or harm. In the earlier image, suppose people 
are simply not prepared to take the rough with the smooth, and insist on rights against 
even modest damage, rather than ‘pooling’ exposure. Well, the smooth will not be so 
smooth for anyone. It will no longer be the case that ‘what you lose on the swings, you 
gain on the roundabout.’ Making sure you never lose out means that you will lose out, 
compared to what might have been. Policy making will become more risk-averse, and in 
what I have called fortunate circumstances we can all expect to lose over time.
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Consequently assigning rights seems not to get us where we need to be. How about the 
strategy hinted at above, of conversion – dragging everything into the well-lit street? The 
idea, then, would be not to adjust the decision procedure but to adjust the world so that it 
fits the procedure. How can this be done? The main problem we face may well be the fact 
that disadvantages cluster which makes the assumption of true odds unlikely to be true. 
Now it seems to me that we have independent reasons, based on distributive justice, to 
wish to challenge and break up such clustering and thereby help bring about true odds. 
Although it may be utopian to think we can ever complete such a task, the closer we get 
to it, the more appropriate it will be to use cost-benefit analysis, for the benefit of 
everyone.
Hence if we cannot bring about favourable circumstances – and in fact even if we could -
it is worth considering the possibility of approaching decision- making through two 
waves of policy. The first wave uses cost-benefit analysis; the second mops up 
afterwards, or even better acts concurrently to ensure that no harm is done to those 
already relatively badly off. Some time ago I proposed a version of this, calling it a ‘weak 
equity axiom’; that is ‘If a change generates a surplus then those already towards the 
bottom of the distribution should not suffer as a result of the change.’xxxiv I would now 
want to interpret this as allowing loss in the short term, but not the medium. Having 
thought of this as a modification to utilitarianism, I was rather astonished to discover that 
Bentham had made a similar point. When advocating the introduction of the printing 
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press in Tripoli and Greece, he warned 'care should be taken that the employment given 
to it should not be such as to throw out of employment any of the existing scribes, except 
in so far as other employment not less advantageous is found for them'.xxxv
From a classical utilitarian point of view, why worry about the scribes? Bentham, no 
doubt, had some idea of indirect maximising strategies in mind: noting the value of 
security, and also appreciating that mitigating the loss of the scribes – which they will 
feel very heavily -  will cost relatively little. But this type of secondary policy can be 
supported on Rawlsian as well as utilitarian grounds, and is appropriate in large, one-off, 
cases and circumstances where probabilities do not run true. Indeed it may be no accident 
that Rawls sees the most plausibility alternative to his theory a hybrid view in which a 
liberty principle is supplemented by utilitarianism subject to a social minimum.xxxvi
Perhaps several theoretical approaches, including Rawls’s own concern for the worst off, 
all converge on the same decision procedure for public policy.
The idea of two waves of policy may bring to mind Musgrave’s classic distinction 
between the allocative branch and the distributive branch of economic governance. 
Clearly there is a great deal in common between my approach and Musgrave’s.xxxvii
However, there are also differences worth emphasising too. My account does not appeal 
to the value of efficiency in its own right at any point. Hence, unlike Musgrave I make no 
observations about personal incentives, labour supply, marginal tax rates, and so on. 
Rather I point out that in order to make the worst off as well off as possible society needs 
to take risks which may in fact, over the short term, make the worst off worse off. Hence 
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my concern even at the first stage is distributive. For that reason it is important that we 
have already taken some steps to bring us closer to fortunate circumstances, especially in 
relation to clusters of disadvantage. Efficiency, then, turns out to be a very welcome bi-
product. However given that we are unlikely to meet all the conditions of favourable 
circumstances, and, even if we were improbable runs of odds may leave some people 
badly off, a second wave of policy, as for Musgrave, will be needed to mop up ill effects 
of the first. So there are differences and parallels between Musgrave’s ideas and those 
presented in this paper.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion it is worth reflecting on Will Kymlicka’s interesting diagnosis of 
the problem with utilitarianism.xxxviii According to Kymlicka the fundamental impulse of 
utilitarianism is Bentham’s dictum that everyone is to count for one and no one for more 
than one. Bentham, argues Kymlicka, was too quick to interpret this egalitarian premise 
in additive terms, summing advantages. The problem, we have seen, is this leads to 
unacceptable outcomes in certain types of case. Kymlicka’s response is that Bentham 
should have been an egalitarian in the tradition started by Rawls and completed by 
Dworkin. My reply is that the counter-examples are good reasons for limiting 
utilitarianism’s scope as a decision procedure, but need not force its complete rejection. 
There are two reasons why this is welcome. First. no one else has told us how to 
approach public policy decision making (except decisions of an explicitly redistributive 
kind, involving transfers of money). Second, we  can all be better off Bentham’s way. 
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Under fortunate circumstances Utilitarianism – and with it cost-benefit analysis – can 
make us all better off.xxxix
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